how was the panic of 1837 resolved

how was the panic of 1837 resolved

Table of Contents 72, The bank veto set the stage for the fall presidential campaign between Clay and Jackson. © 2005-document.write(new Date().getFullYear()) The Lehrman Institute. So did Jackson, who played "everyman" to Biddle's "rich man." Voters instead heeded the president's warnings about the political threat posed by the BUS's concentration of wealth." Jackson vigorously rebuffed business critics who visited the White House: "Go to Nicholas Biddle. It is the usurpation which has convinced the Country." 122 Rousseau wrote that "these measures reduced the specie reserves of the deposit banks in New York City from $7.2 million on 1 September 1836 to $2.8 million by 1 March 1837 and a mere $1.5 million by 1 May. And thus did it come about that bank loans were enormously expanded and the business of the country worked up into a fever of speculation whose crisis was reached in three years. It was the culmination of a long train of events that extended back over a number of years. Senator Clay delivered an impassioned speech on the Senate floor in which he addressed Vice President Martin Van Buren, then presiding over the Senate. For the bourgeoisie, it quelled the conflict of labor militancy and Bank War. Since commerical banking systems operate on a fractional reserve basis, a decline of their specie holdings forced a manifold contraction of their demand liabilities, the medium used by the general public for conducting all its purchases and sales." Unless destroyed, Kendall charged, this `great enemy of republicanism' would resort to bribery, intimidation, and every other corrupt means to elect its own candidate to the White House in 1835 and regain its charter as soon as Jackson left office. After the panic of 1837, when many investors suffered heavy losses, the exchange began to demand that companies disclose to the public information about their finances as a condition of offering stock. This objective was soon supplanted by the view that the Bank, `as at present organized,' in the words Andrew Jackson often repeated, should be brought to an end. Robert E. Wright and David Cowen wrote: "The usual story is that Jackson abhorred banks, bankers, and banknotes and embarked on a personal vendetta to extinguish them. Only that isn't what happened. 94, Biddle was engaged in a dangerous political and economic duel with Jackson. 150 Congress blocked however this initiative, delaying its implementation until the last year of Van Buren's single term - shortly before a Whig administration was came to power in Washington. 14 " Other banks did not fare so well. It will be difficult, when Congress comes finally to decide the question, to obtain a majority against the accumulation of topics of opposition. A masterpiece of political propaganda aimed directly at voters, Jackson's veto message denounced the Bank as an unconstitutional excess of national authority, as a monstrous concentration of private power that threatened popular liberty, and as an engine of aristocratic privilege that favored the rich at the expense of the poor." 93 Historian Edward Pessen wrote of Biddle that the "policy of contraction, initiated in August 1833 and continued for more than a year, was undertaken by a man fighting fire with fire, ready to drive banks to their knees and bring economic activity to a halt, if to do so might compel the government to reconsider its policy. His aim was to increase the circulation and yet avoid the dangers which nearly wrecked the bank between 1817 and 1819. 157, The causes for the Panic of 1837 were manifold although the weighting of the causes has long been debated. Biddle was the enemy. If possible, there was even greater excitement in the chamber than when Webster spoke because of Clay's reputation as a gut fighter who would pull no punches in giving Jackson his due. Jackson's Treasury secretaries did not possess their predecessors' financial and administrative expertise, but the early ones did try to protect the bank politically. Biddle also indirectly controlled the votes of thousands through favorable loans, generous terms, and easy access to cash. As Biddle was growing in financial stature, his future nemesis, General Andrew Jackson, was growing in political stature. The banks already admitted to Jackson's favor closed up to keep others out; but some got into the pet circle by steady pressure, others by a flying leap, while those which were kept out altogether had very little local supervision to restrain them from being as reckless as they chose. The President sent it to the State Department at 11.45 P. M., March 3, 1837, and filed his reasons for not signing it, it having been sent to him less than ten days before the end of the session. First, if a branch banking system had been in place, much of the movement of balances associated with the distribution would not have required specie. General Jackson, accordingly, determined to act without Congress and on his own responsibility. They wrote: "According to his close associate James Hamilton, Jackson had in mind a national money: his proposed bank would `afford [a] uniform circulating medium' and he promised to support any bank that would `answer the purposes of a safe depository of the public treasure and furnish the means of its ready transmission.' held that adding a second bridge over the river violated the charter rights of the company that built the first bridge. 131 Historian William Graham Sumner wrote: "Van Buren was now at the height of his ambition; but the financial and commercial storm which had been gathering for two or three years, the accumulated result of rash ignorance and violent self-will acting on some of the most delicate social interests, was just ready to burst. 145 Woodrow Wilson observed: In the face of economic contraction and political opposition, Van Buren maintained his course. 132, President Van Buren was called upon to deal with the sins of the previous administration. Historian Major L. Wilson wrote that politically, "the panic of 1837 had great impact. `A more deranging, radical, law-upsetting document was never promulgated by the wildest Roman fanatic,' one new England editor declared of the veto message. Arousing Jackson's always sensitive manly honor, Kendall claimed that unless he moved decisively, his backers would decide he was `wanting either in the courage or in the good faith' to finish what he had started." 79 The bank's effectiveness, however, was not the primary issue. The president added, `I do not dislike your bank any more than all banks. The Panic was followed by a six-year depression, with the failure of banks and record unemployment levels. Historian H. W. Brands wrote: "Biddle's patronizing attitude toward Jackson reflected the conventional wisdom of the East toward the warrior from the West, but it also followed from a rare personal meeting of the two men. 159 Bray Hammond wrote that Jackson's second term "fiscal policy...was a product of the current over-trading, inflation, and speculation, but also a contributor thereto. 60 Charles Sellers observed: "Few pronouncements have had a greater impact on American politics." The Senator responded gallantly that if the people did support the administration, he would fear self-government had failed; but it is noticeable that he did not take up the Vice-President's wager." 54, Nor was the president's veto decision based on opinions within his Cabinet. When Clay finished, Van Buren dramatically left the dais to go to where Clay was standing. 158 The Bulletin of the Business Historical Society argued: "Three events, almost coincident in time, precipitated the crash. The banks of deposit had suspended payment; there was nothing to be done but to direct the agents of the Treasury to keep and account for as best they could the moneys which came into their hands. Democrats were its main inciters because it muted the mounting native/Irish conflict in their working-class constituency. `Is there no danger to our liberty and independence?...Will there not be cause to tremble for the purity of our elections in peace and for the independence of our country in war?'" Historian James C. Curtis wrote: "With the passage of the recharter bill, the president knew there would be no way to keep the bank issue out of the election. Economic historian Susan Hoffman noted: "By 1832, when Biddle asked Congress to renew the charter, there was...widespread support for the institution throughout the country: by state legislators, by state banks, and among the people generally. After having been passed by the House, it was sent to Tyler for his approval." It did not, however, have a death grip on local economies. Economic historian Peter L. Rousseau wrote that in 1837 the prospects for cotton sales started bright in the United States but quickly darkened: "In the mist of a shortage of specie in the money centers, news of a fall in the British price for U.S. cotton appeared in the New Orleans newspapers on 22 March. The British depression led to restrictive lending policies by Great Britain that curtailed the flow of money and credit to the United States. Jackson, not exactly a man to back away from a fight, was only too happy to take up the challenge." An `Independent Treasury Act,' signed July 4, 1840, provided that the Treasury of the United States should itself supply vaults and places of deposit for the revenues, at Washington and at other cities appointed for their receipt; that all federal officers charged with their receipt, safe keeping, or disbursement should be put under proper and sufficient bonds for their careful and honest use and custody; and that all payments thereafter made either to or by the United States should be made in gold or silver only. The Bank was the agent of the executive branch, and in Jackson's opinion, the charter conferred powers on this institution that were both unnecessary and dangerous to the nation.'" This confirmed earlier reports of reductions in foreign demand. Between 1830 and January 1, 1834, the banking capital of the United States had risen from $61,000,000 to about $200,000,000; the loans and discounts of the banks from $200,000,000 to $324,000,000; and their note circulation from $61,000,000 to $95,000,000. 115 Financial historian Margaret G. Myers noted: "By June 1836 thirty-three banks were being used as depositaries. The friends of the Bank would have to argue the question before the public against the official act of the President, and against the weight of his popularity. Two actions in the summer of 1836 changed the economic dynamics - one an act of Congress not really supported by the Administration and the other an act by the Administration not supported by Congress. When bills are redeemable at sight in specie, banks will hoard bullion to meet the demands at their counter; the community prefer paper meantime as their more convenient medium of traffic, since the sound currency of a nation is not gold, but the paper which is as good as gold. The affair resulted in the shutdown of the Bank and its replacement by state banks. Daniel Webster decried the `fearful and appalling aspect' of the power Jackson claimed for himself, and accused the president of trying to set `the poor against the rich.' Historian Major L. Wilson noted that "the economic development of the United States depended upon foreign aid in the form of English credit. The Panic of 1837 was a financial crisis in the United States that touched off a major depression, which lasted until the mid-1840s. Saving the deposit banks, according to this view, was only a secondary part of the Jacksonian heritage; the primary goal remained one of enlarging the amount of specie in circulation." 199 By the end of the planned process, the Treasury was empty and there was nothing to distribute. And that I believe would emphatically be the fate of the present President. Indications from the extant records suggest that the financial panic may not have … To the intense frustration of those around him the president ignored the regulatory purpose served by the national bank's banking activity." New York's business community was the chief source of the Bank's funds, and yet the Bank was controlled by Philadelphians, who could say how much the New Yorkers might borrow `of their own money.' Of the bank's twenty-five directors, only five were chosen by the government, the rest by the stockholders of the bank. Two months later, New York City banks suspended specie payments. Both the effects of the retraction and Biddle's role in causing it have been exaggerated."

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